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This paper studies the properties of a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model - a combination of a static two-good,
two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin trade model and a two-sector growth model - with infinitely lived consumers
where international borrowing and lending are not permitted.  We obtain two main results:  First, even
if factor prices are equalized, countries that differ only in their initial endowments of capital per worker
may converge or diverge in income levels over time, depending on the elasticity of substitution between
traded goods.  Divergence can occur for parameter values that would imply convergence in a world
of closed economies and vice versa.  Second, factor price equalization in a given period does not imply
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1.  Introduction  
In 2004, GDP per capita in the United States was roughly 40,000 U.S. dollars.  Using 
exchange rates to convert pesos to dollars, we calculate GDP per capita in Mexico in 2004 to be 
roughly 6,500 U.S. dollars.  In 1935, the United States had income per capita of about 6,600 2004 
U.S. dollars.  To predict what will happen in the Mexican economy over the next 70 years, should 
we study what happened to the U.S. economy since 1935?  Or should we take into account that, in 
1935, the United States was the country with the highest income in the world, while, in 2004, 
Mexico had a very large trade relation with the United States — a country with a level of income 
per capita approximately six times larger?  If we use a purchasing power comparison method to 
calculate Mexican GDP per capita in 2004, we come up with 9,800 U.S. dollars, which was 
roughly the U.S. level in 1941, but the qualitative nature of our question remains the same.  
Much of the discussion of convergence of income levels in traditional growth theory relies 
on models of closed economies.  (See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003.)  In this paper 
we ask:  Do the convergence results obtained in closed economy growth models change when we 
introduce trade?  Specifically, we consider a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model — a combination of 
a static two-good, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin trade model and a two-sector growth model — with 
infinitely lived consumers where borrowing and lending are not permitted.  We find that 
introducing trade into the growth model radically changes the convergence results:  In many 
environments where income levels converge over time if the countries are closed, for example, they 
diverge if the countries are open.  This is because favorable changes in the terms of trade for poor 
countries reduce their incentives to accumulate capital. 
The model that we use is a special case of the general dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model 
studied by Bajona and Kehoe (2006).  There are n countries that differ only in their population 
sizes and their initial endowments of capital.  There are two traded goods that are produced using 
capital and labor; one of the goods is more capital intensive than the other.  Time is discrete, and 
there is a nontraded investment good that is produced using the two traded goods.  Consumers have 
utility functions that are homothetic and identical across countries.  They combine the two traded 
goods to obtain utility in the same manner as firms combine these goods to obtain the investment 
good in the sense that the period utility function has the form  12 12 (, )l o g(, ) tt tt uc c fc c = , where  f is 
the production function of the investment good.  As we will see, this assumption allows us to  
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reduce the calculation of equilibria in which all countries produce both traded goods in every 
period to the calculation of an equilibrium of an appropriately specified one-sector model. 
The model that we study is both a classic Heckscher-Ohlin model and a classic growth 
model in the sense that the two factors of production are identified as labor and physical capital.  A 
country that is capital abundant in the terminology of Heckscher-Ohlin theory is rich in the 
terminology of growth theory.  It would be straightforward to redo the analysis for a model in 
which the two factors of production were labor and human capital.  It would be more complicated 
to extend the analysis to a model with more than two factors of production.  Nevertheless, even in 
models with more than two factors, we would expect the central message of this paper to carry 
over:  Consider a model of closed economies in which countries become richer because they 
accumulate a factor, or factors, of production.  Suppose that convergence in income levels is driven 
by returns to a factor being higher in countries that are poorer because they have less of the factor.  
Opening the economies in this model to international trade will reduce the returns to the factor, 
thereby reducing incentives to accumulate the factor and reducing the tendency towards 
convergence. 
There is a large literature that is at least partially related to the topic studied here.  Bardhan 
(1965) and Oniki and Uzawa (1965) study the patterns of specialization and trade in a Heckscher-
Ohlin model in which consumers have fixed savings rates.  Deardorff and Hanson (1978) consider 
a model in which these fixed savings rates differ across countries and show that the country with 
the higher savings rate will export the capital intensive good in the steady state.  Stiglitz (1970) also 
considers models with fixed savings behavior, in this case a Marxian specification where all labor 
income is consumed and all capital income is saved.  In addition, he considers a model in which 
there are infinitely lived, utility-maximizing consumers with different discount rates in each 
country.  Stiglitz studies the pattern of trade and specialization in the steady state of this model and 
studies dynamic equilibrium paths in a small open economy version of the model.   
Chen (1992) studies the long-run equilibria of two-country, dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin 
models with utility-maximizing agents and identical preferences in both countries under the 
assumption that both countries produce both goods.  He finds that there is a continuum of steady 
states in such models and that, unless initial capital-labor ratios are equal, there is trade in the 
steady state.  Chen also shows that cycles are possible in such models when one good is the 
consumption good and the other is the investment good if the consumption good is capital  
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intensive.  Baxter (1992) considers a model similar to Chen’s but in which tax rates differ across 
countries.  She shows that the pattern of trade and specialization in the steady state is determined 
by these taxes.  Brecher, Chen, and Choudhri (2002) consider a model with differences in 
technologies across countries.  Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), Bond, Trask, and Wang (2003), 
Doi, Nishimura, and Shimomura (2002), and Ono and Shibata (2005) study dynamic Heckscher-
Ohlin models with endogenous growth or externalities. 
A number of researchers have studied dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models using the small 
open economy assumption:  Findlay (1970), Mussa (1978), Smith (1984), Atkeson and Kehoe 
(2000), Chatterjee and Shukayev (2004), and Obiols-Homs (2005).  Atkeson and Kehoe and 
Chatterjee and Shukayev are of particular relevance to our paper.  Atkeson and Kehoe study a 
model in which the rest of the world is in its steady state and the small open economy starts with 
either a lower or a higher capital-labor ratio.  They show that, if the small open economy is outside 
the rest of the world’s cone of diversification, then the country converges to the boundary of this 
cone.  If the small country starts inside the cone of diversification, then it too is in steady state and 
stays there.  This result is in sharp contrast to our result that, for certain parameter values and initial 
conditions, even if all countries start in the cone of diversification, some necessarily leave it.  
Contrasting our results with those of Atkeson and Kehoe shows how strong their assumptions are 
that the rest of the world is in its steady state and that there are no general equilibrium price effects.  
Chatterjee and Shukayev consider a model similar to that of Atkeson and Kehoe in which there are 
stochastic productivity shocks and show that, over time, the comparative advantage conferred by 
different initial endowments can disappear over time. 
The paper most closely related to ours is Ventura (1997), who studies trade and growth in a 
dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model with utility-maximizing consumers and identical preferences 
across countries.  He assumes that there are two traded goods — one capital intensive and one labor 
intensive — that are used in consumption and investment.  Ventura abstracts away from studying 
the patterns of specialization by assuming that each good uses only one of the factors in its 
production process.  Under this assumption, all countries produce both goods independently of 
their relative factor endowments.  Ventura studies the evolution of capital stocks over time.  Our 
paper differs from his in that (1) we use discrete time rather than continuous time because it makes 
it easier to obtain analytical results, although we show how our results can be extended to a 
continuous-time version of the model, (2) we study the evolution of income levels as well as of  
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capital stocks, (3) we obtain conditions under which countries remain in the cone of diversification 
and under which they leave it in models with more general production structures, and (4) we study 
the possibility of equilibria in which one or more countries have zero investment in some periods, a 
possibility that is present in Ventura’s (1997) model, but which is ignored.  It is also worth 
mentioning the work of Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2004), who present numerical experiments using a 
three-good, two-factor version of the Ventura model. 
In this paper we study the patterns of trade, capital accumulation, and income growth over 
time as a function of the countries’ initial relative endowments of capital and labor.  We find, as 
does Ventura (1997), that, if both countries diversify over the entire equilibrium path, the elasticity 
of substitution between traded goods is crucial in determining convergence behavior.  This is no 
longer true when one of the countries specializes in production in some period.  For a given 
elasticity of substitution, whether countries converge or diverge depends on the pattern of 
specialization over time.  We present an example in which countries’ income levels converge in 
equilibria without factor price equalization for an elasticity of substitution that implies divergence 
in income for equilibria with factor price equalization along the equilibrium path.  We also present 
an example in which corner solutions in investment cause our convergence results to break down. 
2.  The general model 
There are n countries,  1,..., in = .   Each has a continuum of measure 
i L  of identical, 
infinitely lived consumer-workers, each of whom is endowed with  0
i k  units of capital in period 0 
and one unit of labor in every period t,  0,1,... t = .   There are three goods in the economy: an 
investment good, x, which is not traded, and two traded goods,  j y ,  1, 2 j = , which can be 
consumed or used in the production of the investment good.   
Each traded good  j ,  1, 2 j = , is produced with a constant returns to scale technology that 
uses capital, k , and labor, A: 
  (,) jj j j yk φ = A . (1) 
We assume that good 1 is relatively capital intensive and that the technologies are such that there 
are no factor intensity reversals.  Producers minimize costs taking prices as given and earn zero 
profits.  The first-order conditions from the producers’ problems are  
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 (,) jj K j j rp k φ ≥ A ,     if      0 j k = >  (2) 
  (,) jj L j j wp k φ ≥ A ,     if      0 j = > A  (3) 
for each  j , 1,2 j = , where r is the rental rate, w is the wage, and  j p  is the price of good  j , 
1, 2 j = .  Additional subscripts —  ( , ) jK j j k φ A , ( , ) jL j j k φ A  — denote partial derivatives.  
The investment good is produced according to the constant-returns production function 
  12 (, ) x fxx = . (4) 
Letting q be the price of the investment good, the first-order conditions for profit maximization are   
  11 1 2 (, ) p qf x x ≥ ,   1   if      0 x = >  (5) 
  22 1 2 (, ) p qf x x ≥ ,   2   if      0 x = > . (6)   
In each period, consumers decide how much of each traded good to consume,  1t c ,  2t c  and 
how much capital to accumulate for the next period,  1 t k + .  We assume that there is no international 
borrowing or lending.  Bajona and Kehoe (2006) argue that allowing international borrowing and 
lending ensures factor price equalization but results in indeterminacy of production and trade in 
equilibrium.  
The representative consumer in country i solves the maximization problem 
12 0 max ( , )
ti i
tt t uc c β
∞
= ∑  
  11 22 s.t.
ii i i i i i
tt tt t t t tt p cp cq xw r k ++ ≤ +  (7) 
1 (1 )
ii i
tt t kk x δ + − −≤  
0
i
jt c ≥ ,0
i
t x ≥  
00
ii kk ≤ , 
where β , 0 1 β <<  is the common discount factor and δ , 01 δ ≤ ≤ , is  the depreciation rate. 
The feasibility condition for good  j , 1,2 j = , is 
 
11 ()
nn ii i i i
jt jt jt ii Lc x L y
== += ∑∑ . (8)  
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Labor and capital are perfectly mobile across sectors within a country, but not across countries. 
Therefore, the feasibility conditions in each country i, 1,..., in = , are 
  12
ii i
tt t kkk + ≤  (9) 
  12 1
ii
tt + ≤ AA . (10) 
Likewise, the investment good is nontraded and the feasibility condition in each country i is 
  12 (, )
ii i
tt t x fx x = . (11) 
It is easy to show that allowing for trade of the investment good would only generate indeterminacy 
of trade in this model, without otherwise changing the set of equilibria. 
Before analyzing the properties of the model described above, we list the main assumptions 
of the model: 
A.1.  There are n countries, which are populated by infinitely lived consumers. Countries differ 
only in their population sizes,  0
i L > , and their initial endowments of capital,  0 0
i k > .  
A.2.  There are two traded goods, which can be consumed or used in the production of the 
investment good.  The production functions of the traded goods, ( , ) j k φ A , are increasing, concave, 
continuously differentiable, and homogeneous of degree one. 
A.3.  Traded good 1 is relatively capital intensive, and there are no factor intensity reversals:  For 




(/, 1 ) (/, 1 )










.   (12) 
A.4.  Labor and capital are perfectly mobile across sectors but are not mobile across countries. 
A.5.  There is an investment good in each country, which is not traded.  The production function 
for the investment good, 12 (, ) f xx , is increasing, concave, continuously differentiable, and 
homogeneous of degree one.  
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A.6.  The period utility function  12 (, ) uc c  is homothetic, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and 
twice continuously differentiable, and it satisfies  01 2 lim ( , )
j cj ucc → = ∞. 
Definition 1:  An equilibrium of the world economy is sequences of prices, { } 12 ,, , ,
ii i
tt t t t p pq w r, 
consumptions, investments, and capital stocks { } 12 ,, ,
ii ii
tt t t ccxk, production plans for the traded 
goods, { } ,,
ii i
jt jt jt ykA , and production plans for the investment goods{ } 12 ,,
ii i
ttt x xx , such that: 
1.  Given prices { } 12 ,, , ,
ii i
tt t t t p pq w r, the consumptions and capital stocks { } 12 ,,
ii i
tt t cck solve the 
consumers’ problem (7). 
2.  Given prices { } 12 ,, , ,
ii i
tt t t t p pq w r, the production plans { } ,,
ii i
jt jt jt ykA  and { } 12 ,,
ii i
ttt x xx  satisfy the 
cost minimization and zero profit conditions (2), (3), (5), and (6).   
3.  The consumption, capital stock, { } 12 ,,
ii i
tt t cck, and production plans, { } ,,
ii i
jt jt jt ykA  and 
{ } 12 ,,
ii i
ttt x xx , satisfy the feasibility conditions (1), (4), (8), (9), (10), and (11).  
Notice that, since trade equalizes the prices of the traded goods across countries, the prices 
of the investment good are also equal, 
i
tt qq = .  Since the cost minimization problems are the same 
across countries, this is true even if some country i does not produce the investment good in period 
t.  The homogeneity of the budget constraints in (7) and the cost minimization and zero profit 
conditions (2), (3), (5), and (6) in current period prices allow us to impose a numeraire in each 
period.  We set 
 1 t q = , 0,1,... t =  (13) 
It is worth noting that the assumption of no international borrowing and lending implies that 
trade balance holds: 
  11 1 1 22 2 2 () ( ) 0
iii ii i
tt t t tt t t py c x py c x −− + −− = . (14) 
This condition can be derived from the budget constant in the consumer’s problem (7) and the cost 
minimization and zero profit conditions (2), (3), (5), and (6).  
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Definition 2.  A steady state of the world economy is consumption levels, an investment level, and 
a capital stock, { } 12 ˆ ˆˆˆ ,,,
ii ii ccxk , factors of production and output for each traded industry, { } ˆˆ ˆ ,,
ii i
jj j ykl , 
1, 2 j = , factors of production and output for the investment sector { } 12 ˆˆˆ ,,
iii x xx, and prices 
{ } 12 ˆˆˆˆ ,,,
ii p pwr, for  1,..., in = ,  that satisfy the conditions of a competitive equilibrium for 
appropriate initial endowments of capital,  0 ˆ ii kk = .  Here we set  ˆ t ν ν =  for all t, where ν  
represents a generic variable. 
We say that a steady state is a nontrivial steady state if at least one of the countries has a 
positive level of capital in that steady state:  ˆ 0
i k >  for some  1,..., . in =    
The steady state results for general dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models with infinitely lived 
consumers derived in Bajona and Kehoe (2006) apply to the Ventura model.  The following 
propositions state them without proof. 
Proposition 1: Under assumptions A.1-A.6, in any nontrivial steady state factor prices are 
equalized. 
Proposition 2: Under assumptions A.1-A.6, if there exists a nontrivial steady state, then there 
exists a continuum of them, which have the same prices and world capital-labor ratio,  ˆ k .  These 
steady states are indexed by the distribution of capital-labor ratios across countries, 
1 ˆˆ ,...,
n kk .  
Furthermore, international trade occurs in every steady state in which  ˆˆ i kk ≠  for some i. 
3.  The integrated economy 
The characterization and computation of equilibrium of the model described in the previous 
section is difficult in general, since it involves determining the pattern of specialization in 
production over an infinite horizon.  (See Bajona and Kehoe 2006 for some results on the 
equilibrium of the general model.)  Numerical methods are usually needed to compute equilibrium.  
The characterization and computation of equilibrium becomes much easier, however, when the 
model specification is such that we can solve for the equilibrium by disaggregating the equilibrium 
of the integrated economy — a closed economy with initial factor endowments equal to the world 
endowments — which is equivalent to a two-sector growth model.  (See Dixit and Norman 1980  
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for a description of the methodology.)  In this case, the equilibrium prices and aggregate 
consumption, production, and investment of our economy coincide with the equilibrium prices, 
consumption, production, and investment of the integrated economy.  
Consider the social planner’s problem 
12 0 max ( , )
t
tt t uc c β
∞
= ∑  
  11 11 1 1 s.t. ( , ) tt t t t cxy k φ + ≤= A  (15) 
22 22 2 2 (,) tt t t t cxy k φ + ≤= A  
11 2 (1 ) ( , ) tt t t t kk x f x x δ + − −≤ =  
12 tt t kkk + ≤   
12 1 tt + ≤ AA  
0 jt c ≥ ,0 jt x ≥  
00 kk ≤ , 
where  00 11 /
nn ii i
ii kL k L
== =∑∑ .  Notice that assumption A.1 implies that  0 0 k > .  
Proposition 3:  Suppose that the allocation { } 12 ,, tt t cck, { } 111 ,, ttt ykA , { } 222 ,, ttt ykA , { } 12 ,, ttt x xx  
solves the social planner’s problem (15).  Then this allocation, together with the prices 
{ } 12 ,, , , tt t t t ppq w r , is an equilibrium of the integrated economy where  1 t q = ,  11 1 2 (, ) tt t p fxx = , 
22 1 2 (, ) tt t p fxx = ,  11 1 1 (,) tt K t t rp k φ = A , and  11 1 1 (,) tt L t t wp k φ = A .  Conversely, suppose that 
{ } 12 ,, , , tt t t t ppq w r , { } 12 ,, tt t cck, { } 111 ,, ttt ykA , { } 222 ,, ttt ykA , { } 12 ,, ttt x xx  is an equilibrium of the 
integrated economy.  Then the equilibrium allocation solves the social planner’s problem (15).  
Furthermore, if the social planner’s problem has a solution, then it is the unique equilibrium 
allocation of the integrated economy. 
Proof:  The first claim is just the second theorem of welfare economics, and the second claim is the 
first theorem.  In our setting, it is straightforward to prove these claims by showing that the first-
order conditions and transversality condition for the social planner’s problem are equivalent to the 
equilibrium conditions in the definition of equilibrium where there is only one country,  1 n = .  If 
the utility function is bounded on the constraint set of the social planner’s problem, there exists a  
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solution to this problem.  Since the function u  is strictly concave and the functions  1 φ ,  2 φ , and  f  
are concave, the solution to the planner’s problem is unique, which implies that there is a unique 
equilibrium to the integrated economy. ■ 
Once we have the equilibrium of the integrated economy, to compute an equilibrium of the 
world economy, we need to disaggregate the consumption, investment, and production decisions 
across countries, to find, for example,  1
i
t c ,  1,..., in = , such that 
  11 11 /
nn ii i
tt ii Lc L c
== = ∑ ∑ . (16) 
Whether an equilibrium can be solved this way is a guess-and-verify approach.   
First consider the disaggregation of production decisions.  If capital-labor ratios are very 
different across countries, assigning nonnegative production plans for both goods to all countries is 
not consistent with their having the same factor prices, and solving for equilibrium using the 
integrated approach is not possible.  Figure 1, known as the Lerner diagram, shows the 
endowments of capital and labor that are consistent with using the integrated economy approach to 
solve for equilibrium for a static Heckscher-Ohlin model.  Let  12 , p p  be the equilibrium prices of 
the traded goods in the integrated economy.  The rays  11 / k A  and  22 / k A  represent the capital-labor 
ratios used in the production of each good in the equilibrium of the integrated economy.  The area 
between both rays is called the cone of diversification.  If all countries have endowments of capital 
and labor in the cone of diversification, the equilibrium prices of the integrated economy are 
consistent with nonnegative production plans for both goods in all countries.   
To find the cone of diversification, we solve the problem 
11 1 1 22 2 2 max  ( , ) ( , ) pk p k φ φ + AA  
  12 s.t. kkk + ≤  (17) 
12 1 + ≤ AA  
0 j k ≥ , 0 j ≥ A . 
If  1 p  and  2 p  are the equilibrium prices of the integrated economy, then, since  1
i
t c  and  2
i
t c  are both 
strictly positive by assumption A.6, the solution to this problem is such that  111 (,) 0 k φ > A  and 
222 (,)0 k φ > A .  Assumption A.1 implies that  11 22 // kk > AA .  The cone of diversification is  
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specified by these sector-specific capital-labor ratios, which depend only on the relative price 
21 / p p ,  12 1 (/) p p κ  and  22 1 (/) p p κ .  It is the set of country specific capital-labor ratios 
i k  such that 
  12 1 22 1 (/) (/)
i p pk p p κκ ≥≥ . (18) 
In our dynamic economy, the cone of diversification changes over time since the capital-
labor ratio and, consequently, the equilibrium prices of the integrated economy, change over time.  
Therefore, to solve for an equilibrium using the integrated economy approach, we need to find a 
way to disaggregate the investment decisions such that countries stay in the corresponding cone of 
diversification for all time periods.   
Given that the period utility function is identical and homothetic across countries, factor 
price equalization implies that we can use the integrated economy approach to solve for 
equilibrium in a static model.  In our dynamic economy, there is an additional possible 
complication:  If one of the countries has a corner solution in which it chooses zero investment in 
some period while another country chooses positive investment, then we cannot disaggregate the 
consumption and investment decisions of the integrated economy.  Later, we will show how this 
possibility makes it difficult to characterize equilibria. 
In the rest of the paper, we assume that consumers combine the two traded goods in 
consumption in the same way that producers of the investment good combine these two goods in 
production:  
  ( ) 12 12 (, ) (, ) uc c v fc c = , (19) 
where v is a strictly concave, strictly increasing function.  This assumption simplifies the dynamics 
of the model, since it makes the integrated economy equivalent to a one-sector growth model and, 
therefore, cycles and chaos are ruled out as possible equilibrium behavior of the integrated 
economy.   To simplify the analysis we further assume, as does Ventura (1997), that the function v 
is logarithmic. 
A.7.  The period utility function u  takes the form  ( ) 12 12 (, ) l o g (, ) uc c fc c = . 
Consider the production function defined by solving  
12 (,) m a x ( , ) Fk f y y = A   
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  11 1 1 s.t. ( , ) yk φ ≤ A  (20) 
22 2 2 (,) yk φ ≤ A  
12 kkk + ≤  
12 + ≤ AAA  
0 j k ≥ , 0 j ≥ A . 
Assumptions A.6 and A.7 imply that  f  is strictly quasi-concave, which, together with the 
concavity of  1 φ  and  2 φ , implies that for any (,) k A  there is a unique solution to this problem.  It is 
straightforward to prove that F  is increasing, concave, continuously differentiable, and 
homogeneous of degree one.  Like  f , F  is strictly quasi-concave.   
Assumption A.7 is useful because it allows us to solve the two-sector social planner’s 
problem (15) by solving the related one-sector social planner’s problem 
0 max log
t
t t c β
∞
= ∑  
 s.t. ( ,1) tt t cxF k + ≤    (21) 
1 (1 ) tt t kk x δ + − −≤  
0 t c ≥ ,0 t x ≥  
00 kk ≤ . 
We state the following proposition without giving a proof because, first, the proof is just a 
straightforward application of the maximum theorem, and, second, we will not employ the 
proposition in its general form, but rather will only consider production functions for which we can 
analytically solve problem (20).  
Proposition 4.   Let  1(,) yk A ,  2(,) yk A ,  1(,) kk A ,  1(,) k AA ,  2(,) kk A ,  2(,) k AA  denote the solution to 
(20).   If { } 12 ,, tt t cck, { } 111 ,, ttt ykA , { } 222 ,, ttt ykA , { } 12 ,, ttt x xx  solves the two-sector social planner’s 
problem (15), then { } ,, ttt ckx  solves the one-sector social planner’s problem (21) where  
12 (, ) tt t cf c c = .  Conversely, if { } ,, ttt ckx  solves the one-sector social planner’s problem (21), then 
{ } 12 ,, tt t cck, { } 111 ,, ttt ykA , { } 222 ,, ttt ykA , { } 12 ,, ttt x xx  solves the two-sector social planner’s problem  
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(15) where  (, 1 ) jt j t yy k = ,  (, 1 ) jt j t kk k = ,  (, 1 ) jt j t k = AA ,  [ ] /( ) ( ,1) jt t t t j t cc c x y k =+ , and 
[ ] /( ) ( ,1) jt t t t j t x xcxy k =+ . 
We first consider a version of the model in which the production function  j φ  for each 
traded good uses only one factor of production.  Under this assumption, factor prices equalize 
along the equilibrium path independently of initial conditions.  Since this is the assumption made 
by Ventura (1997), we call this version of the model the Ventura model.   By disaggregating the 
equilibrium of the integrated economy, we derive results on the evolution of the world distributions 
of income and of capital in the Ventura model.  We also show by means of an example that, even 
though factor price equalization holds in every equilibrium of the Ventura model, there may be 
equilibria in which there is zero investment in some countries and in which our results for the 
integrated economy do not hold.    
We then consider a version of the model in which the more general production functions  j φ  
have the same constant elasticity of substitution as does the production function for the investment 
good  f .  In such models, factor prices need not equalize along the equilibrium path, but, if they 
do, the equilibria have the same properties as those of the Ventura model.  We refer to this version 
of the model as the generalized Ventura model.  In this model, we derive the cone of diversification 
analytically, and give conditions under which, if countries are in the cone of diversification, they 
stay there.  We also derive conditions under which, even if countries start in the cone of 
diversification, they leave it in a finite number of periods.  Finally, for the special case of Cobb-
Douglas production functions, we analytically solve the model when there is factor price 
equalization. 
4.  Ventura model 
Following Ventura (1997), we assume that the production function for each of the traded 
goods uses only one factor of production:  
  11 1 1 1 (,) yk k φ = = A  (22) 
  22 2 2 2 (,) yk φ = = AA . (23)  
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This assumption implies that the cone of diversification is the entire nonnegative quadrant, 
independently of the prices  1t p  and  2t p , and that factor prices equalize along any equilibrium path:  
1
i
tt t rrp ==  and  2
i
tt t wwp ==.  Notice that, in this case,  (, 1 ) (, 1 ) Fk fk = . 
Furthermore, we assume that the production function of the investment good has a constant 
elasticity of substitution between the inputs of the two traded goods: 
  ( )
1/
12 1 1 2 2 (, )
b bb fxx da x a x =+ (24) 
if  0 b ≠ , and  f is 
 
12
12 12 (, )
aa f xx d xx =  (25) 
in the limit where  0 b = .  Here  0 i a >  and  12 1 aa + = .  The elasticity of substitution is  1/(1 ) b σ = − .  
In what follows, we can easily translate statements involving b  into statements involving σ . 
It is worth pointing out that Ventura (1997) considers a continuous-time version of this 
model.  For completeness, we later sketch out our results for the continuous-time model. 
Suppose that we find the equilibrium of the integrated economy by solving the one-sector 
social planner’s problem (21).  To disaggregate consumption and investment, we solve the utility 
maximization of the representative consumer i, (7): 
0 max log
ti
t t c β
∞
= ∑  
 s.t.
ii i
tt t t t cxwr k +≤+  (26) 
1 (1 )
ii i
tt t kk x δ + − −≤  
0
i
jt c ≥ , 0
i
t x ≥  
00
ii kk ≤ . 
If we solve (7), we can obtain a solution to (26) by setting  12 (, )
ii i
tt t cf c c = , and, if we solve (26), we 
can obtain a solution to (7) by setting  1 /( )
ii i
tt tt t t cc k w r k =+ ,  2 /( )
ii i
ttt t t cc w r k =+ ,  1 /( )
ii i
tt tt t t x xk w rk =+ , 
2 /( )
ii i
ttt t t x xwr k =+ . 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a sequence of consumption levels and capital 












−+ − + ≤ ,  if    0
i
t x = >  (27) 
  1 (1 )
ii i i
tt t t t t ck kwr k δ + +− − = +, (28) 









β →∞ + =  (29) 
holds.  If   0
i
t x >  for all i and all t, then we are justified in using the integrated economy approach. 
We solve for the integrated economy equilibrium in the Ventura model by solving for the 
equilibrium of a one-sector growth model.  Notice, however, that the two sectors matter a lot for 
disaggregating the equilibrium.  In particular, we cannot solve for the equilibrium values of the 
variables for one of the countries by solving an optimal growth problem for that country in 
isolation.  Instead, the equilibrium path of a specific country’s capital stock and its steady state 
value depend not only on the country’s initial endowment of capital but also — through the interest 
rate  t r  — on the equilibrium path of the world’s capital stock, and its steady state value. 
If there is positive investment in every period, then the equilibrium path for the integrated 
economy is determined by the difference equations 
  ( ) 11 1( ) tt t cr k c βδ ++ =− +  (30) 
  1 (1 ) ( ,1) tt t t ck k f k δ + + −− = , (31) 
the initial condition  00 0 11 /
nn ii i
ii kk L k L









β →∞ + = . (32) 
Here ( ) t rk  is the rental rate of capital, 
 
1




()   i f   0
()  










⎧ +≠ ⎪ = ⎨
= ⎪ ⎩
. (33) 
Standard results for one-sector models (for example, Rebelo 1991) say that the equilibrium 
of the integrated economy has sustained growth for some values of the parameters.   The existence  
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of steady state depends upon whether the rental rate of capital as a function of initial endowments, 
() rk, can take the value 1/ 1 β δ −+  for some  0 k > .  If   ( ) 1/ 1 rk β δ < −+  for all k , then  t k  
converges to 0.  If, however,  ( ) 1/ 1 rk β δ >− +  for all k , then  t k  grows without bound.  Consider 
an economy without labor, where feasible allocations satisfy 




tt t ck d a k δ + += + −  (34) 









tt kd a k βδ + =+ − . 
Definition 3.  We say that an equilibrium converges to the sustained growth path of the 
corresponding economy without labor if  
  ( )( )
1/
1 lim / 1 1
b
tt t ck d a β δ →∞ = −+ −  (35) 
  ( )
1/
11 lim / 1
b
ttt kk d a β δ →∞ + = +−  (36) 
Standard results from, for example, Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) provide the 
following characterization of the equilibrium of the integrated economy. 
Lemma 1:  The behavior of the equilibrium of the integrated economy of the Ventura model 
depends on parameter values: 
1.  If  0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/ 1
b da βδ −+ > , the trivial steady state is the unique steady state, and the unique 
equilibrium of the integrated economy converges to it. 
2.  If  0 b = , if  0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/ 1
b da βδ −+ ≤ , or if  0 b >  and 
1/
1 1/ 1
b da βδ −+ > , there is a unique 
nontrivial stable steady state characterized by the solution of the equation  ˆ () 1 / 1 rk β δ =− + , 
and the unique equilibrium of the integrated economy converges to it.  
3.  If  0 b >  and 
1/
1 1/ 1
b da βδ −+ ≤ , there is no nontrivial steady state, and the unique equilibrium 
of the integrated economy converges to the sustained growth path. 
In the case where  0 b =  and  1 δ = , there is an analytical solution to the one-sector social 












tt ca d k β =−  (38) 
For other parameter values, we need to use numerical methods to solve for the equilibrium.  
Nevertheless, we can derive analytic results on the evolution of the distribution of income levels 
over time that depend on the values of variables in the integrated economy equilibrium.  
Qualitatively characterizing the integrated economy equilibrium then allows us to qualitatively 
characterize the evolution of income levels.  In particular, we can find conditions under which 
relative income levels converge and conditions under which they diverge.  The next proposition 
derives a formula that compares the level of income per capita in a given country measured in 
current prices, 
ii
tt t t yw r k =+ , to the world’s average at any given period,  tt t t ywr k =+ , to the same 
relative income position in the previous period.   
Proposition 5.  In the Ventura model, if  0
i
t x >  for all i and all t, the income level of country i 





tt t t t t
tt t




⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −−−
== ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (39) 
where  1 / tt t t sr c y − = ,  1,2,... t = , and  [ ] 00 0 0 0 /( 1 ) sr c r y βδ =+ − .  When there is complete 
depreciation,  1 δ = , / tt t sc y = , 0,1,... t = . 
Proof:  Subtracting the first-order condition for the consumer’s problem in the open economy from 












= . (40) 
It is here that the assumption of no corner solutions in investment is essential, allowing us to 
impose the first-order conditions (27) and (30) as equalities.  Manipulating the first-order 
conditions (27) and the budget constraints (26), we obtain the familiar demand function for 






(1 ) (1 )
1
s i i









=− ++− ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ∑ ∏ . (41) 
Notice that, since we have factor price equalization, 
  (1 )(1 )( )
ii
tt t tt cc r kk βδ −=− +− − . (42) 
The budget constraint (26) implies that 
  11 (1 )( )
ii i
ttt t t tt cck k r kk δ ++ −+ − =+− − . (43) 












− =− . (44) 
The difference between a country’s income per worker and the world’s income per worker is 
  11 1 11 ()
ii
tt t tt yyr kk ++ + ++ −= − . (45) 
Using the expression for  11
i
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⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −−−
== ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, (47) 
where  1 / tt t t sr c y − =  for  1,2,... t =  and  [ ] 00 0 0 0 /( 1 ) sr c r y βδ =+ − .  When  1, δ =   1 / tt t cc r β − =  
implies that we can factor β  out of the numerator and the denominator of (47) and set  / tt t sc y = .■ 
The proof of this proposition relies on factor price equalization occurring in every period 
and on there never being a corner solution in investment.  If factor prices are not equal in some 
period in the future, the demand functions (41) for each individual country and for the integrated 
economy would have different prices in that period and, therefore, equation (42) would not hold.  
Likewise, if a corner solution in investment occurs, equation (40) need not hold.  We later provide  
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examples in which lack of factor price equalization and the lack of interior solutions for investment 
cause the characterization of behavior of relative income in proposition 5 to fail. 
Equation (39) in the previous proposition compares a country’s income relative to the world 
average.  Whether countries converge or diverge in their income levels depends on whether the 
ratio  11 / tt t rc y ++  decreases or increases over time.  If the ratio increases, countries’ incomes move 
further away from the income of the integrated economy and, thus, there is divergence in income 
levels.   If the ratio decreases, countries’ income levels become closer to the average income level, 
and there is convergence in income levels.  If the ratio is constant, countries maintain their initial 
income differences and, therefore, the distribution of income stays constant.
   We should stress that 
here convergence means that countries’ income levels become more similar over time.  It does not 
mean that they converge to the same level of income:  Although the absolute value of ( )/
i
ttt yyy −  
can be strictly decreasing over time, it can converge to a constant different from 0. 
Using proposition 5, we can reduce the characterization of the convergence properties of 
equilibria in the case with complete depreciation to a characterization of the behavior of  / tt t sc y =  
in the solution to the one-sector social planner’s problem (21).   
Lemma 2.  In the unique equilibrium of the integrated economy of the Ventura model with 
complete depreciation, the behavior of  / tt t sc y =  depends on parameter values: 
1.  If  0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β > , then  t s  is a strictly decreasing sequence that converges to 1 β − . 
2.  If  0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β ≤ , then  t s  converges to  ˆˆˆ [ ( ,1) ]/ ( ,1) f kk f k −  where  ˆ k  is the unique 
nontrivial stable steady state.  If   0 ˆ kk < ,  t s  is a strictly increasing sequence; if  0 ˆ kk > ,  t s  is a 
strictly decreasing sequence. 
3.  If  0 b = , then  1 1 t sa β =−  is constant. 
4.  If  0 b >  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β > , then  t s  converges to  ˆˆˆ [ ( ,1) ]/ ( ,1) f kk f k − .  If   0 ˆ kk < ,  t s  is a strictly 
decreasing sequence; if  0 ˆ kk > ,  t s  is a strictly increasing sequence. 
5.  If  0 b >  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β ≤ , then  t s  is a strictly decreasing sequence that converges to 1 β − .  
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Proof:  Since the result for the case 3, where  0 b = , follows trivially from equation (38), we 
concern ourselves with the other cases, where  0 b <  or  0 b > .  Multiplying and dividing the Euler 





























Notice that  '( ) 0 hk<  if  0 b <  and that  '( ) 0 hk> if  0 b > .  Notice that, in the limit where  0 b = , 
1 () hk a =  and  '( ) 0 hk= .  We use the monotonicity of the sequence  t k  in any solution to the one-
sector social planner’s problem (21) to establish monotonicity properties for the sequence  t h .  The 
theorem is then established by showing that the monotonicity properties for the sequence  t h  imply 
the desired monotonicity properties for the sequence  t s . 
Consider the different cases enumerated in the statement of the theorem.  In case 1, where 
0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β > ,  t k  is a strictly decreasing sequence that converges to 0, which implies that  
t h  is a strictly increasing sequence that converges to 1.  In case 2, where  0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β ≤ , 
and in case 4, where  0 b >  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β > ,  t k  is a strictly increasing sequence that converges to  ˆ k  
if  0 ˆ kk <  and a strictly decreasing sequence that converges to  ˆ k  if  0 ˆ kk > .  In case 2, this implies 
that  t h  is a strictly decreasing sequence if  0 ˆ kk <  and a strictly increasing sequence if  0 ˆ kk > .  In 
case 4, however,  t h  is a strictly increasing sequence if  0 ˆ kk <  and a decreasing sequence if  0 ˆ kk > .   
In both cases,  t h  converges to  11 2 ˆˆ /( )
bb ak ak a +  no matter what the initial value of  t k .  In case 5, 
where  0 b >  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β ≤ ,  t k  is a strictly increasing sequence that grows without bound, which 
implies that   t h  is an increasing sequence that converges to 1. 
We now argue that, if  t h  is strictly increasing along a solution path to (21), then  t s  is 
strictly decreasing and, if  t h  is strictly decreasing, then   t s  is strictly increasing.  We begin with the  
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case where  t h  is strictly increasing.  Suppose, to the contrary, that, although  t h  is strictly 
increasing,  t s  is not strictly decreasing, that is, there exists T such that  1 TT ss − ≥ .  Since  t h  is 











− >− ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (50) 









− >− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, (51) 
which implies that  1 TT ss + > .  Iterating, we find that, for all tT > , the sequence  t s  is strictly 










+ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −
=− > − = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
.      (52) 
In the limit, the sequences  t h  and (1 )/ t s β −  both converge to the same limit,  ˆ (1 ) / s β − .  Equation 








> , (53) 
which contradicts our assumption that  t h  is strictly increasing.  We prove that, when  t h  is strictly 
decreasing,  t s  is strictly decreasing, using the same argument and just reversing the inequalities.■ 
The next proposition provides our main results for the Ventura model.  It follows 
immediately from proposition 5 and lemma 2. 
Proposition 6.  (Convergence in relative income levels)  In the Ventura model with complete 
depreciation, if  0
i
t x >  for all i and all t: 
1.  If  0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β > , then there is convergence in relative income levels.  
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2.  If  0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β ≤ , then there is divergence in relative income levels if  0 ˆ kk <  and 
convergence in relative income levels if  0 ˆ kk > . 
3.  If  0 b = , relative income levels stay constant. 
4.  If  0 b >  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β > , then there is convergence in relative income levels if  0 ˆ kk <  and 
divergence in relative income levels if  0 ˆ kk > . 
5.  If  0 b >  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β ≤ , then there is convergence in relative income levels. 
We have analyzed all of the cases enumerated in the statement of proposition 6 for the sake 
of completeness.  Case 1 and cases 2 and 4 where  0 ˆ kk >  are less interesting than the others.  The 
contrast of the remaining results with the analogous results for a world of closed economies is 
striking:  In cases 2, 3, and 4, if the countries are closed to trade, we know that relative income 
levels converge over time because all countries have equilibria that converge to the steady state of 
the integrated economy.  If we open the countries to trade, however, relative income levels diverge 
if  0 b <  and stay fixed if  0 b = .  Notice that, if  0 b > , relative income levels converge, but not to 
the same level as they do in a the world of closed economies.  In case 5, if the countries are closed 
to trade, we know that relative income levels diverge over time because growth accelerates over 
time and countries that start with lower income levels because they have lower initial capital stocks 
grow more slowly.  If we open these economies to trade, however, income levels converge. 
The intuition for the results in proposition 6, at least for the cases where  0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/
b da β ≤  and where 0 b = , is obvious:  In a world of closed economies, poor countries — that is, 
countries with lower initial capital stocks — grow faster than rich countries because lower capital 
stocks lead to higher returns on investment.  Trade equalizes the return on capital in poor and rich 
countries, eliminating the incentive for higher investment in poor countries. 
  We are left with the question:  When are there corner solutions in investment for 
individual countries, which make the integrated economy approach and the characterization of 
equilibria in propositions 3, 4, 5, and 6 invalid?  The answer is found in the next proposition. 
Proposition 7.  In the Ventura model with complete depreciation, for the cases enumerated in the 
statement of lemma 2 where the sequence  / tt t sc y =  in the equilibrium of the integrated economy  
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is constant or strictly decreasing, there exists an equilibrium where  0
i
t x >  for all i and all t.  For 










→∞ = . (54) 
This limit is well defined.  Let  min i  be the country with the lowest initial endowment of capital per 
worker,  00












then there exists an equilibrium where  0
i
t x >  for all i and all t.  Otherwise, there is no equilibrium 
where 0
i
t x >  for all i and all t.  When there exists an equilibrium with no corner solutions in 
investment, it is the unique such equilibrium. 












the sequence  t z  has the same monotonicity properties as the sequence  t s .  In the cases where  t s  
converges to 1 β − ,  t z  converges to (1 ) / β β − .  In the cases where  t s  converges to 





tt tt t t
tt t
kk zk k zkk
kz k z k
−−
−−
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −− −
== ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (57) 
Since assumption A.1 implies that  0 0
i k > , we know that  000 () /1
i kkk − >− .  If  t z  is weakly 
increasing, or if  t z  is strictly decreasing but condition (55) holds, then  0
ii
tt xk = >  for all i and all 
t.  If, on the other hand, if  t z  is strictly decreasing and condition (55) does not hold, then the 
investment decisions in the integrated economy equilibrium cannot be disaggregated as in 
proposition 5 to assign nonnegative investment to each country in every period.    
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Uniqueness of the disaggregation of the integrated economy equilibrium, if it exists, follows 
from the uniqueness of the solution to the one-sector social planner’s problem (21).■ 
Uniqueness of the disaggregation of the integrated economy equilibrium is easy to establish 
because this equilibrium solves a social planner’s problem.  It is more difficult to say anything 
about uniqueness of equilibria, if they exist, that involve corner solutions in investment or, in the 
more general model in the next section, that involve lack of factor price equalization.  In such 
equilibria, Pareto improvements are possible if we allow international borrowing and lending. 
5.  Generalized Ventura model 
Consider a generalization of the Ventura model in which the production functions  , f   1 φ ,  
and  2 φ  are general constant returns to scale production functions.  Propositions 3 and 4 indicate 
that we can find the integrated economy of the generalized Ventura model by solving the one-
sector growth social planner’s problem (21).   
In this generalized Ventura model, factor price equalization need not occur at any given 
period of time.  Countries can specialize in the production of one of the traded goods, factor prices 
can differ across countries and, therefore, the equilibrium cannot be solved using the integrated 
approach in general.  In what follows, we characterize the cone of diversification for some specific 
versions of the model and derive conditions under which factor price equalization in a given period 
implies factor price equalization in every subsequent period.  In such cases, the results of the 
Ventura model on the evolution of the distribution of income apply to the generalized Ventura 
model.  For situations where factor prices do not equalize after a finite number of periods, the 
analysis done in the Ventura model is no longer valid.  Numerical experiments are needed to 
determine the behavior of the countries’ distribution of income.   
5.1. The C.E.S. model 
 We first consider the model in which  
  ( )
1/
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (,) ( 1 )
b bb yk k φθ α α == + − AA  (58) 
  ( )
1/
22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 (,) ( 1 )  
b bb yk k φθ α α == + − AA  (59)  
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  ( )
1/
12 1 1 2 2 (, )
b bb fyy da y a y =+ , (60) 
where  1 b ≤ ,  0 b ≠ , and  21 1 aa =− .  Notice that, since we have assumed no factor intensity 
reversals in the production of the traded goods, the production functions  j φ , 1,2 j = , need to have 
the same constant elasticity of substitution.  Setting this elasticity equal to that of the production 
function for investment good  f  allows us to analytically solve for the function F .  
We refer to this as the C.E.S. model.  Here the parameter b determines the common 
elasticity of substitution  1/(1 ) b σ =− , and the production function F defined in (20) is also a 
C.E.S. production function, with the same elasticity of substitution and with the share parameters 
that are combinations of the share parameters of the production functions  1 φ ,  2 φ , and  f : 
  ( )
1/
12 (,)
b bb Fk DA k A =+ AA  (61) 
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++ − + − ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥
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,  21 1 AA =−  (62) 
  () () () ()
1
11 11 1 1
11 1 1
11 1 222 1 1 1 2 2 2 (1 ) (1 )
bb b
bb b b bb b b Dd a a a a αθ αθ α θ α θ
−−
−− − −
⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎪⎪ =++ − + − ⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
. (63) 
To determine when factor price equalization occurs and when it does not, we need to 
characterize the cone of diversification in the integrated economy and how it changes with the 
world capital-labor ratio.  One procedure would be to solve (17) to determine the sector-specific 
capital-labor ratios as functions of relative prices,  12 1 (/) p p κ  and  22 1 (/) p p κ , then use proposition 
4 to determine the prices in the integrated economy equilibrium,  () 11 11 () (, 1 ) ,(, 1 ) tt t pk f yk yk =  and 
() 22 11 () (, 1 ) ,(, 1 ) tt t pk f yk yk = , and, finally, calculate  ( ) 12 1 () / () tt p kp k κ  and  () 22 1 () / () tt p kp k κ .  In 
the C.E.S. model, the determination of the cone of diversification of the integrated economy is far 
simpler than this.  Solving the maximization problem that defines F , (20), we find that 
  () 21 () / () jt tj t p kp k k κκ = ,  1, 2 j = , (64)  
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where the constants  1 κ ,  2 κ  that determine the cone of diversification have the form 
  () ()
() ()
11 1



















= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ +
,  1, 2 j = . (65) 
The next propositions establish conditions under which, for the C.E.S. model, factor price 
equalization in a given period implies factor price equalization in all subsequent periods.  The first 
proposition gives sufficient conditions for factor prices to equalize along the equilibrium path, 
given that factor price equalization occurs in a given period T .  The key parameter is, once again, 
b .  In particular, when  0 b > , factor price equalization at T ensures factor price equalization in any 
subsequent period, at least for the economically interesting cases either where  0 ˆ kk ≤  and or where 
t k  goes without bound.  The second proposition gives sufficient conditions under which factor 
price equalization cannot hold forever.  It states that, when  0 b < , and when 
1/
1 1/
b DA β ≤  and 
0 ˆ kk < , if factor price equalization holds at a period T  and the capital-labor ratio of one of the 
countries is close enough to the boundary of the cone of diversification, factor price equalization 
cannot hold for all subsequent periods.  The intuition is simple.  If factor price equalization were to 
occur forever, the analysis in the Ventura model would apply, and the distribution of capital-labor 
ratios would become more dispersed over time.  Since the boundaries of the cone of diversification 
for the integrated economy are linear functions of the world capital-labor ratio, however, if the 
capital-labor ratio of one of the countries is close enough to the boundary of the cone, the 
distribution of capital-labor ratios cannot become more dispersed if all capital-labor ratios are to 
remain in the cone.   
Proposition 8: In the C.E.S. model with complete depreciation, suppose that the sequence 
/ tt t sc y =  in the equilibrium of the integrated economy is weakly decreasing.  Suppose that factor 
price equalization occurs in period  . T   Then there exists an equilibrium in which factor price 
equalization occurs at all  . tT ≥   Furthermore, this equilibrium is the only such equilibrium. 
Proof:  Assume that all countries are in the cone of diversification at period T .  Define 
i
t k , tT > , 













where  1 / tt t zck − =  and  00 0 0 /( ) zc r k β =  are defined as in the statement of proposition 7.  We need to 
show that disaggregating capital this way keeps countries in the cone of diversification and that it 
solves the equilibrium of our model economy.  To prove that the countries remain in the cone, we 
need to show that, for all tT ≥ , 
  21
i
tt t kk k κ κ ≤≤ . (67) 
That is, for all tT ≥ , 








− ≤≤ − . (68) 
Since we have assumed that sequence  t s  is weakly decreasing, we know from the proof of 
proposition 7 that the sequence is weakly decreasing.  
To prove that these sequences of capitals, together with the equilibrium prices of the 
















=− + ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦ ∑ ∏ , (69) 
where  s w  and  s r  are equilibrium prices of the integrated economy, and show that consumptions 
and capital stocks defined this way solve the equilibrium of our model economy.■ 
Proposition 9:  In the C.E.S. model with complete depreciation, suppose that the sequence  t s  is 










→∞ = . (70) 
Let  min i  be the country with the lowest initial endowment of capital per worker, and let  max i  be the 
country with the highest,  00 0





























then there exists an equilibrium with factor price equalization in every period.  If, however, either 
of the conditions (71) or (72) is violated, there is no equilibrium with factor price equalization in 
every period.  When there exists an equilibrium with factor price equalization in every period, it is 
the unique such equilibrium. 
Proof:  This proof is an obvious generalization of the proof of proposition 7 using the definitions in 
proposition 8.■ 
Even though its proof is trivial given the machinery that we have developed, proposition 9 
is a powerful result.  Under some general conditions, even if factor price equalization occurs at a 
given period, at some point in the future factor prices will differ across countries.  In the case where 
0 b <  and 
1/
1 1/
b DA β ≤ , for example, the unique equilibrium of the integrated economy converges 
to the nontrivial steady state, but, if initial endowments of capital per worker are sufficiently 
different in the sense that either of the conditions (71) or (72) is violated, then there is no 
disaggregated equilibrium that corresponds to it.  Even if the world economy starts with all 
countries diversifying in production and factor prices equalized, at some point at least one country 
necessarily has its capital-labor ratio leave the cone of diversification. 
Abstracting away from the patterns of specialization, as Ventura (1997), Chen (1992), and 
many others do, can cause us to miss out on some important dynamics precisely in the interesting 
cases, the cases in which there is potentially divergence of income levels.  In such cases, we cannot 
use the integrated economy approach to solve for the equilibrium, and none of the analysis in 
propositions 3, 4, and 5 applies.  Instead, we need to use numerical methods to compute the 
equilibrium.  We briefly explain how to compute equilibrium for the generalized Ventura model in 
section 6 and present examples of economies for which factor prices are not equalized along the 




5.2. The Cobb-Douglas model 
In this section, we consider the limiting case of the C.E.S. model with complete 
depreciation and with  0 b = , that is, with production functions that are Cobb-Douglas.  
 
11 1
11 1 1 1 1 1 (,) yk k
α α φθ
− == AA  (73) 
 
22 1
22 2 2 2 2 2 (,) yk k
α α φθ
− == AA  (74) 
 
12
12 12 (, )
aa f yy d yy = . (75) 
In this case, the function F is also Cobb-Douglas: 
 
12 (,)
AA Fk D k = AA  (76) 
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= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
,  1, 2 j = . (79) 
Proposition 10:  In the Cobb-Douglas model with complete depreciation, suppose that factor price 
equalization occurs in period T .  Then factor price equalization occurs at all  . tT ≥   Furthermore,  
 
ii
tt kk γ = , (80) 
where  /
ii




tt kA D k β + =  for  . tT ≥   
The proof of this proposition is a special case of the proof of proposition 8.    
Notice that, when all  0
i k  are in the cone of diversification, we can use proposition 10 to 
obtain analytic solutions for all variables.  Let  00 /
ii kk γ = , where  21





tt rA D k






































































































































































































































A  (87) 
where 
  ()
11 11 (1 )/(1 )
11 1 0
t t AA AA
tt kA D k A D k ββ
−−
− == . (88) 
6.  Computation of equilibrium 
In characterizing the cone of diversification of the integrated economy as the set of capital-
labor ratios 
i
t k  that satisfy  21
i
tt t kk k κκ ≤≤ , we have relied heavily, not just on the assumption of 
specific functional forms for  1 φ ,  2 φ , and  f , but also on the assumption that all countries produce 
both goods.  Under these assumptions, we derive optimal capital-labor ratios in each industry as 
functions of the world capital-labor ratio.   If capital-labor ratios for all countries are inside the 
cone of diversification, we are justified in using the integrated economy approach.  If not, and at 
least one of the countries specializes,  21 / tt p p  does not, in general, equal to its value in the 
integrated equilibrium.  Consequently, we cannot use  ( ) 21 () / () jt tj t p kp k k κ κ =  to characterize the 
cone of diversification and to determine the pattern of specialization.  Instead, we must calculate 
12 1 (/) p p κ  and  22 1 (/) p p κ  by solving (17).  In the next section, we provide an example that 
illustrates how  21 (/) jt t p p κ  differs from  jt k κ  when one of the countries specializes.  
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In the C.E.S. model, the cone of diversification is determined by the capital-labor ratios 
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. (92) 
If the integrated economy approach is valid because there are no corner solutions in 
investment and all countries have capital-labor ratios that remain in the cone of diversification, then 
we need only solve for the sequence of capital stocks for the integrated economy by solving the 
one-sector social planner’s problem (21) to solve for equilibrium.  Given this solution, we can then 











to disaggregate consumption and investment decisions.  We disaggregate production decisions by 
requiring that all countries use capital and labor in the optimal proportions,  /
ii
jt jt j t kk κ = A , and 
satisfy the feasibility conditions (9) and (10).   
If the integrated economy approach is not valid, the situation is far more complicated.  To 
keep our discussion simple, we ignore the possibility of corner solutions in investment and instead 
focus on the case where complications arise because of specialization in production.  The approach 
that we take is to guess the sequence of capital stocks for all countries and the sequence of prices 
for good 1.  Given the price of good 1, we use the first-order conditions   
  11 2 11 2 1 (, ) (,)
ii ii
tt tt t f xx f cc p = =  (94)  
 
32
to determine the ratio  12 12 //
ii ii
tt tt x xc c = .  Given this ratio, we can determine the price of the second 
good using the first-order condition 
  21 2 2 (, )
ii
tt t f xx p = . (95) 
Given the prices  1t p  and  2t p , we can determine the cone of diversification by solving for 
12 1 (/) p p κ  and  22 1 (/) p p κ .  Given the cone of diversification, we can solve for the pattern of 
production and the factor prices in each country.  We can divide total income into consumption and 
investment by fixing investment at the level needed to accumulate capital for the next period. 
For computation, we need to reduce the remaining equilibrium conditions to a finite number 
of equations in the same finite number of unknowns, which are the sequence of capital stocks for 
all countries and the sequence of prices for good 1 that we have guessed.  We do this by truncating 
the time horizon at some period T  by assuming that the equilibrium approximately converges to a 
steady state — or a sustained growth path, depending on parameter values — by that period.  
Bajona and Kehoe (2006) argue that any steady state of the generalized Ventura model has factor 
price equalization across countries.  In addition, they show that factor prices equalize as countries 
converge to a sustained growth path.  They also argue that equilibrium cycles are not possible. 
In the appendix, we provide details on the algorithm that we use to compute equilibria in 
the examples in the next section, including an example with corner solutions in investment.   
7.  Numerical examples  
In this section, we present three numerical examples that illustrate different equilibrium 
patterns for the Ventura model when there are corner solutions in investment and for the  
generalized Ventura model when countries are not in the cone of diversification along the entire 
equilibrium path.   In each of the examples, we consider a two-country economy.  We set  0.95 β = , 
1 δ = , and 
12 10 LL ==.   
Example 1. (Ventura model with  0 b < )   
  ( )
2 0.5 0.5
12 1 2 (, )1 0 0 . 5 0 . 5 fxx x x
− −− =+ . (96) 
We contrast two different worlds.  In the first world, 
1
0 5 k =  and 
2
0 3 k = .  Here there is an 
equilibrium with no corner solutions for investment.  The solid lines in figure 2 depict the  
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equilibrium paths for 
i
t k  in this world.  Proposition 5 says that relative income levels diverge over 
time, and the solid lines in figure 3 depict this divergence, with 
1 () / ttt yyy −  increasing from 
0.1531 in period 0 to 0.1707 in the steady state.  (We show the relative income for country 1 only 
because symmetry implies that 
21 () /() / ttt ttt yyy yyy −= − −.)  In the second world, there is an even 
larger difference in initial capital stocks, 
1
0 6 k =  and 
2
0 2 k = .  In this world, the integrated economy 
equilibrium is the same as in the first world, but it cannot be disaggregated because there is no 
equilibrium without corner solutions in investment.  The dashed lines in figure 2 depict the 
equilibrium paths for 
i
t k  in this world.  Country 2 has  0
ii
tt xk = =  starting in period 3.  Proposition 
5 gives us no indication of what happens to the distribution of income across countries:  
1 () / ttt yyy −  increases from 0.3063 in period 0 to 0.3211 in period 1 and then steadily declines, 
until it equals 0.2977 in the steady state.  Notice that relative incomes converge between periods 1 
and 2 even though investment is strictly positive in both countries in both periods. 
Example 2. (Cobb-Douglas model) 
 
0.6 0.4
1(,) 1 0 kk φ = AA  (97) 
 
0.4 0.6
2(,) 1 0 kk φ = AA  (98) 
 
0.5 0.5
12 1 2 (, ) f xx xx =  (99) 
We assume that 
1
0 4 k =  and 
2
0 0.1 k = .  Figure 4 shows that the initial endowments of capital per 
worker are different enough for factor prices not to equalize across countries in period 0.  The labor 
abundant country, country 2, specializes in the production of the labor intensive good, and the 
capital abundant country, country 1, diversifies.  This pattern of production is maintained along the 
equilibrium path, with 
2
t k  asymptotically converging to the boundary of the cone of diversification.  
Notice that, even though the 
1
t k   is outside the cone of diversification of the integrated economy, 
11 2
1() / 2 tt t kk k κ >+  in periods 0, 1, and 2, it is inside the cone of diversification, 
1
12 1 22 1 (/) (/) tt t tt p pk p p κκ >> .  Notice too, in figure 5, that relative incomes converge even though 
proposition 5 says that relative incomes would stay constant if both countries were to diversify.  
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Example 3.  (C.E.S. model with  0 b < ) 
  ( )
2 0.5 0.5
1(,) 1 00 . 8 0 . 2 kk φ
− −− =+ AA  (100) 
  ( )
2 0.5 0.5
2(,) 1 00 . 2 0 . 8 kk φ
− −− =+ AA  (101) 
  ( )
2 0.5 0.5
12 1 2 (, ) 0 . 5 0 . 5 fxx x x
− −− =+  (102) 
We assume that 
1
0 5 k =  and 
2
0 2 k = .  Here both countries start inside the cone of diversification, but 
one of them exits after a finite number of periods.  As figure 7 — a blowup of the detail in figure 6 
— shows, the labor abundant country, country 2, produces both goods in periods 0 and 1.  In period 
2, 
2
t k  jumps outside the cone of diversification and country 2 specializes in the production of the 
labor intensive good.  (We could say that the boundary of the cone of diversification jumps over 
2
t k .)  Over time, 
2
t k  converges back to the boundary of the cone of diversification.  Since country 1 
diversifies along the equilibrium path, factor prices are equalized in periods 0 and 1, but not 
afterward.  Figure 8 shows that relative incomes converge monotonically over time.  This example, 
again, illustrates the limited scope of proposition 5.  Under the assumption that factor prices 
equalize along the equilibrium path, the model reduces to a Ventura model with  0.5 b =−  and 
proposition 5 stipulates divergence in income levels.  As the example shows, however, even if 
factor prices equalize in the initial periods, the opposite convergence result can hold if factor prices 
do not equalize along the entire equilibrium path.  The dashed lines in figures 6, 7, and 8 depict the 
equilibrium of the Ventura model with  ( )
2 0.5 0.5
12 1 2 ( , ) 5.7328 0.5 0.5 fxx x x
− −− =+ , a model with the 
same integrated economy equilibrium as our C.E.S. model.  Notice how different are the 
convergence properties of relative incomes in the two equilibria.  
8.  Continuous-time Ventura model 
In this section, we derive the properties of convergence in income levels for the continuous-
time version of the Ventura model.  The utility function becomes 
  12 0 log ( , ) 
t ef c c d t
ρ ∞ − ∫ , (103)  
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where 0 ρ >  is the discount rate.  As in the model with discrete time, the production functions of 
the traded goods are  
  11 yk =  (104) 
  22 y = A ,   (105) 
and the production function for the investment good is 
  12 (, ) x fxx =  (106) 
where  f  is specified as in (24) and (25).   
We can find the integrated economy equilibrium by solving the social planner’s problem 
0 max log  
t ec d t
ρ ∞ − ∫  
  s.t. ( ,1) cx f k + ≤  (107) 
kk x δ + ≤   
0 c ≥ ,  0 x ≥  
0 (0) kk ≤ . 
Given that the cone of diversification is the whole nonnegative quadrant, factor prices equalize at 
all equilibrium prices, and, if there are no corner solutions in investment, we can derive formulas 
relating the equilibrium levels of capital and income to the levels of capital and income in the 
integrated economy equilibrium.  In particular, Ventura (1997) shows that the capital-labor ratios 
satisfy  
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( ) (0)/ (0) (0) (0) (0)
ii i k t kt ct kt k k zt k k
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and draws phase diagrams in ( ,  ) kz space to analyze convergence and divergence of 
i k  and k .   
Notice that this is not the same as convergence and divergence of 
i y  and  y , where  
 (, 1 )
ii i yw r k f k =+ = . (109) 
Since we are more interested in studying convergence in relative income levels than convergence in 
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by analyzing phase diagrams in (,  ) ks space.  Here  () (, 1 ) gk fk k δ = − . 
We use the first-order conditions and feasibility conditions 
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Figures 9-11 depict phase diagrams in ( ,  ) ks space for different values of the parameter b .  Notice 
that the results we obtain are similar to the results obtained in section 4 for the discrete-time 
version of the model.  Figure 9 shows that, for  0 b >  and 
1/
1
b da δ ρ − > , s decreases over time and 
relative incomes converge.  Figure 10 shows that, for  0 b <  and 
1/
1
b da δ ρ − > , if  0 ˆ kk < , relative 
incomes diverge initially for  0 k  small enough, but later converge.  Divergence of income 
everywhere along the equilibrium path is only obtained for very negative values of b  and only for 
cases where there is positive depreciation, where 
1/
1
b da δ ρ − > , and  0 ˆ kk < , as in figure 11. 
Examining equation (108), we see that the continuous-time model can have the same sort of 
problems with corner solutions in investment as does the discrete time model.  If z  increases over 
time, then there are initial endowments of capital per worker sufficiently different so that the 
equilibrium will necessarily involve corner solutions in investment, making the integrated economy  
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approach — and the corresponding phase diagrams —  invalid.  As example 1 indicates, even if we 
allow reversibility of investment and require only that  0
i k ≥ , we can still have corner solutions 
where some countries have zero capital stocks.. 
9.  Concluding remarks 
This paper presents results that some economists may find surprising. 
First, proposition 6 says that introducing international trade into a model that reduces to a 
one-sector growth model can completely change the results on convergence of income levels.  For 
example, if  0 b <  and  1 δ = , and if the economy  is productive enough to converge to a nontrivial 
steady state and capital starts below this steady state, there is convergence of income in a world of 
closed economies but divergence in a world of open economies.  This example illustrates the 
danger of using closed economy models to study development in environments where trade may be 
important.  Not only do results change, but they may be completely the opposite of what the closed 
economy analysis suggests. 
Second, proposition 9 says that factor price equalization in a given period does not imply 
factor price equalization in the future.  In fact, for some parameter values and initial conditions, 
factor price equalization in a given period implies that factor prices cannot be equalized in the 
future. 
Third, our numerical example 3 shows that, unless we can guarantee factor price 
equalization in all periods, our characterization of equilibria — in particular, the convergence 
patterns of relative incomes — is not useful even when there is factor price equalization in the 
current period.  In fact, in a situation where we would expect divergence of income levels if we 
could somehow guarantee factor price equalization in the future, we can get convergence of income 
levels even while we are in the cone of diversification.  This example illustrates the danger of 
ignoring the possibility of specialization in production.  Not only can results change when we allow 
for specialization, but they may be the opposite of what the analysis that assumes factor price 
equalization suggests. 
There is another aspect of our convergence results worth commenting on.  In the case where 
0 b <  and  1 δ = , and where the economy  is productive enough to converge to a nontrivial steady 
state and capital starts below this steady state,  0 ˆ kk < , opening a closed economy that is poorer than 
the world average to free trade slows down its growth and leads to convergence to a steady state  
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with a lower capital-output ratio than the country would have reached had it remained closed.  It is 
easy to show, however, that opening to trade leads to a gain in utility.  Free trade guarantees higher 
utility, not higher growth rates. 
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Appendix:  Algorithm used in the numerical examples 
We first consider the case where the parameter values are such that the equilibrium of the 
integrated economy converges to the nontrivial steady state.  To solve the model, we choose a 
truncation period T  large enough so that the integrated economy equilibrium numerically 
converges to this steady state.  We solve the system of equations using Newton’s method as 
follows. 
1.  Compute the steady state of the integrated economy by solving  ˆ () 1 / 1 rk β δ = −+ .   
2.  Given initial levels of capital in each country  0
i k , guess values for the ( 1) nT +  variables 
i
t k , 
1,..., in = ,  1,..., 1 tT =− ,  1t p ,  0,..., 1 tT =− ,  ˆi k ,  1,..., in = . 
3.  For every t, 0,1,..., 1 tT =−  
•  Compute   12 / tt x x  and  2t p  using equations (94) and (95). 
•  Compute the cone of diversification,  11 2 1 (/) tt t p p κ κ = ,  22 2 1 (/) tt t p p κ κ =  using  equations 
(89) and (90) or equations (91) and (92). 
•  For each country, compute the production of each traded good and the factor prices:   
If  1
i
tt k κ ≥ ,  1
ii
tt kk = ,  1 1
i
t = A ,  11 (, 1 )
ii
tt yk φ = ,  2 0
i
t k = ,  2 0
i
t = A ,  2 0
i
t y = ,  11(, 1 )
ii
tt L t wp k φ = , 
11(, 1 )
ii
tt K t rp k φ = . 
If  12
i
tt t k κκ >> ,  11 2 12 () / ( )
ip i pp p
tt tt tt kk κκ κ κ =− − ,  12 1 2 () / ( )
ii p p p
ttttt k κ κκ =− − A ,  11 1 1 (,)
ii i
tt t yk φ = A , 
22 1 1 2 () / ( )
ip p i p p
tt t ttt kk κκ κ κ =− − ,  21 1 2 () / ( )
ip i p p
tt t t t k κ κκ =− − A ,  22 2 2 (,)
ii i
tt t yk φ = A   11 1 (, 1 )
ip
tt L t wp φκ = , 
11 1 (, 1 )
ip
tt K t rp φκ = . 
If  2
i
tt k κ ≤ ,  1 0
i
t k = ,  1 0
i
t = A ,  1 0
i
t y = ,  2
ii
tt kk = ,  2 1
i
t = A ,  22 (, 1 )
ii
tt yk φ = ,  22 (, 1 )
ii
tt L t wp k φ = , 
22(, 1 )
ii
tt K t rp k φ = . 
•  For each country, compute the demand for each traded good in each country,  11
ii
tt cx + , 
22
ii































•  For each country, compute the total production of the investment good  1 (1 )
ii i
tt t x kk δ + =− − , 
where  ˆ ii
T kk = , and use this to disaggregate  11
ii
tt cx +  and  22
ii
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+ −−+ , 0,..., 2 tT = − , 1,..., in =  (120) 
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− ,  1,..., in =  (121) 
  111 1()
n iii
ttt i ycx
















,  1,..., in = . (123) 
4.  If these functions are not all within some specified distance from 0, adjust the guesses for the 
(1 ) nT +  variables 
i
t k ,  1t p ,  ˆi k  using Newton’s method and go to step 3.  Iterate until 
convergence. 




b DA γ βδ =+ − .  We replace  ˆ k  and  ˆi k  in the above algorithm with   1 1
ˆ n ii
TT i kL k γ − = = ∑  and  ˆi
T k , 
and we replace the functions (121) with 
 
1











−  (124) 
If T  is very large, the Jacobian matrix for Newton’s method will be ill conditioned because some 
of the variables 
i
t k  will be much larger than others.  We can solve this problem by working with 
the rescaled variables  /
ii t
tt kk γ =   ,  1,..., tT = . 
A brute-force way to deal with corner solutions in investment is to guess the pattern of 
corner solutions and to solve the resulting system of equations.  We replace the functions 














+ −−+  (125) 
with  
  1 (1 )
ii
tt kk δ + −− . (126) 
When we have solved this system of equations, we can check that the complementary slackness 
conditions (27) are satisfied: 
 
1











+ − +−+ ≤ (127) 
whenever we have guessed that  0
i
t x = .  If these conditions are satisfied, we can stop.  Otherwise, 
we provide a new guess for the pattern of corner solutions and try again.  
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There is a limitation to the algorithm that is worth noting:  The functions involved in the 
system of equations are not everywhere continuously differentiable.  In particular, production plans 
and factor prices change in a continuous, but not in a continuously differentiable, manner as 
changes in prices cause a country’s capital-labor ratio to pass through the boundary of the cone of 
diversification.  This can cause Newton’s method to be less stable than it is when working with 
continuously differentiable functions.  Nonetheless, by keeping the step sizes in the Newton’s 






A. Atkeson and P. J. Kehoe (2000), “Paths of Development for Early- and Late-Bloomers in a 
Dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin Model,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staff Report 256. 
C. Bajona and T. J. Kehoe (2006), “Demographics in Dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin Models:  
Overlapping Generations versus Infinitely Lived Consumers,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis Staff Report 377. 
P. K. Bardhan (1965), “Equilibrium Growth in the International Economy,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 79:  455–464. 
R. J. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (2003), Economic Growth, second edition, M.I.T. Press. 
M. Baxter (1992), “Fiscal Policy, Specialization, and Trade in the Two-Sector Model. The Return 
to Ricardo?” Journal of Political Economy 100: 713–744. 
E. W. Bond, K. Trask and P. Wang (2003). “Factor Accumulation and Trade: Dynamic 
Comparative Advantage with Endogenous Physical and Human Capital,” International Economic 
Review 44:  1041–1060. 
R. A. Brecher, Z. Chen, and E. U. Choudhri (2002), “Absolute and Comparative Advantage, 
Reconsidered: The Pattern of International Trade with Optimal Saving,” Review of International 
Economics 10:  645–656. 
P. Chatterjee and M. Shukayev (2004). “Convergence in a Stochastic Dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin 
model,” University of Minnesota. 
Z. Chen (1992), “Long-Run Equilibria in a Dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin Model,” Canadian Journal 
of Economics 25:  923–943. 
A. Cuñat and M. Maffezzoli (2004), “Neoclassical Growth and Commodity Trade,” Review of 
Economic Dynamics 7:  707–736.   
A. V. Deardorff and J. A. Hanson (1978). “Accumulation and a Long Run Heckscher-Ohlin 
Theorem,” Economic Inquiry 16:  288–292. 
A. Dixit and V. Norman (1980), The Theory of International Trade:  A Dual General Equilibrium 
Approach, Cambridge University Press. 
J. Doi, K. Nishimura, and K. Shimomura (2002), “Multiple Balanced Growth Paths and 
Indeterminacy in a Two-Country Model,” Kyoto University. 
F. Findlay, F. (1970), “Factor Proportions and Comparative Advantage in the Long Run,” Journal 
of Political Economy 78: 27–34. 
M. Mussa (1978), “Dynamic Adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model,” Journal of 
Political Economy 86:  775–791.  
 
43
K. Nishimura and K. Shimomura (2002), “Trade and Indeterminacy in a Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Model,” Journal of Economic Theory 105:  244–260. 
F. Obiols-Homs (2005), “Trade Effects on the Personal Distribution of Wealth,” Universitat 
Autònoma de Barcelona. 
H. Oniki and H. Uzawa (1965), “Patterns of Trade and Investment in a Dynamics Model of 
International Trade,” Review of Economic Studies 32:  15–38. 
Y. Ono and A. Shibata (2005), “Fiscal Spending, Relative-Price Dynamics, and Welfare in a World 
Economy.” Review of International Economics, 13:  216–236. 
S. Rebelo (1991), “Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 99:  500–521. 
A. Smith (1984), “Capital Theory and Trade Theory,” in Jones R. W. and Kenen P. B. editors, 
Handbook of International Economics, volume 1.  North-Holland, 289–324. 
J. E. Stiglitz (1970), “Factor Price Equalization in a Dynamic Economy,” Journal of Political 
Economy 78:  456–488. 
N. L. Stokey and R. E. Lucas with E. C.  Prescott (1989), Recursive Methods in Economic 
Dynamics.  Harvard University Press.  









    





































00    6,  2 t kk k ==
( )
21 2
00  6,  2 t kk k = =
( )
11 2
00  5,  3 t kk k = =
( )
21 2




22 (,) 1 pk φ = A  
1 rk w + = A  
11 / k A  
22 / k A  
k  

































00 6, 2 kk = =
12


















12 1 (/) tt p p κ
22 1 (/) tt p p κ 1 t k κ





























































12 1 (/) tt p p κ














































































































0 b <  and  0 δ >  
  
 
 
 
0
k
k
=
  
0
s
s
=
  
k
s